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ABSTRACT

This study developed a new defensive model for global voice communications. It
uses a «-person, zero-sum, cooperative and non-cooperative game to optimize the
coalitions revenue after the possibility of a network service provider being tampered by
an adversary. This research optimized two measures of effectiveness (coalition revenue
and network provider revenue) of international telecommunications coalitions by
hardening network service providers and improving their respective revenue with
incentives.
A multi-criteria optimization problem was developed to establish the strategic
competition between the coalition defender and attacker. Irrespective of the amount of
incentives, a applicable hardening and tampering strategy can be obtained. All methods
and models are general and could be easily adapted to other specific applications.
Examples of analysis was conducted on a sample network of seven nodes and presented
in this study.
It was shown that the option to harden NSPs has measurable value whether or not
an incentive is provided for the coalition. In addition, the adversary's tampering strategy
is revealed in the shadow prices associated with the game constraints. Analysis proved
that two objective functions have different measures of effectiveness.

A network

optimized for one objective is more than likely not optimized for the other objective.

IX

Chapter 1. Introduction
Currently, the Department of Defense (DoD) relies on the Public Switched Telephone
Networks (PSTN) for the bulk of its telecommunications. The PSTN is a composite of
multiple interconnected networks, where each network is operated, maintained, and managed
independently from the others. However, the network operators (also known as network
service providers) rely a great deal on each other for routing calls to destinations outside of
their network span. Based on worked out agreements among the service providers, they
decide on how and where they will physically interconnect their networks. These physical
points of interconnection are called Points of Presence (POPs).
In today's world of the telecommunications, there is much concern with the reliability
and security of a given network. Both government and industry have viable concerns
whether or not their messages are both secure from an adversary as well as to the reliability
of the message reaching its destination. Likewise, reliability and vulnerability can be used as
a measuring device when it is time to renew or draft a new contract with the
telecommunication companies.
1.1 Significance
In telecommunication networks, traditional factors that telephone companies consider
when they route external call (calls that are passed from one network onto another network)
typically include costs (tariffs), revenues (retail charges), and link reliability (Bit Error Rate).
Today's PSTN's may have security and reliability risk due to the path a message may be

sent. Since many government agencies use PSTN's for official voice messages, there is a
keen interest on knowing what coalition that routes their information for security concerns.
It is neither the lack of technical expertise nor patriotism that causes a NSP to be a
member of a coalition that has a network that may be vulnerable to adversary tampering.
Instead, it is the lack of finances and possible incentive to form a stronger coalition and
upgrade their network's invulnerability. Networks are primarily designed by the industry to
withstand statistical failure. A planned attack by an adversary may not be taken into account
when a NSP designs a network or forms a coalition.
In the highly competitive industry of voice communication, large amounts of
investments are needed to keep up with ever changing industry standards. These investments
are naturally invested in areas of concern that return the most revenue. Vulnerability as a
whole returns little or no contributions to the NSP's revenue.
1.2 Background
A switched network strategy sends a message from a source node to a sink node as a
complete message. Switched network strategy has many well-known advantages.
Unfortunately, it is inefficient. The inefficiency is caused by the fact that since the message
is sent as a complete message, versus packet switching, an entire link must be allocated to
this message (Vararigos, 1996:693). The public telephone companies will pick a path and
coalition determined upon several factors. The following are some public telecommunication
companies considerations when choosing a coalition:
A. Costs: The Global PSTN consists of multiple networks interconnected by POPs.
Cost is the charge a destination network service provider (NSP) passes onto the
2

originating NSP for completing a call request. In the case where there is no direct
interconnection (POP) between originating and destination NSP, then the
originating NSP will route the call via an intermediate NSP. Cost, in this case,
refers to the charge that the intermediate NSP passes onto the originating NSP for
carrying the call. In sum, cost is an attribute of a network and refers to the fee an
intermediate or destination NSP charges the originating NSP for carrying or
completing the call.
B. Routing Agreements: Agreements may be set up due to political reasons more so
than other factors such as cost and reliability. A political example would be if
network 1 makes an agreement with network 2 to route all of it's external routing.
Thus everybody has a piece of the pie and is happy. Routing agreements are
sometimes conditional. An example of a conditional agreement is one that is
made only if the costs of the routing agreed upon remains below the costs of
taking an alternative route. The algorithm will allow some simple conditionals.
C. Link Reliability: This defines the quality of the link, and can be measured in the
percent of downtime or in the terms of bit error rate.
D. Media Type: This identifies whether the link is fiber, copper, etc.
E. Network Topology: The topology consists of nodes and links. In this case, localarea networks are represented as nodes, and the links are the actual physical
media that interconnects these networks.
F. Partial Information of Path: Given an origin-destination (OD) pair, a portion of the
nodes contained within the path may be known.

1.3 Research Problem
The proposed problem was to create a path prediction model for international
communications. Essentially, the goal was to determine what countries that a voice message
would travel from destination to origin. As the data was gathered, it was realized that the
data of traffic from country / to country j did not take into account any third country routing.
After more investigation of the data, it was realized that there was much data on the revenue
achieved by each country. It was then decided to create a model to investigate the possible
coalition that a NSP may be a member.
This research seeks to use multi-criteria gaming theory to design an incentive and
coalition likelihood prediction tool to be used by the DoD. This tool will be specific to the
needs of DoD and their NSP. This may address the issue of what NSP can best meet the
reliability and vulnerability needs of the DoD.
1.3.1 Assumptions
This research has multiple assumptions. The first is that partial data on specific
PSTN networks will be provided by DoD. The networks will be of the estimated public
telecommunications networks.

Two constraints that are to be considered are security

vulnerability and coalition's revenue. This research will look at the security vulnerability of
the nodes.
In addition, each node in itself is assumed to be a network where the links are the
actual mediums through which the message travels. It will be assumed that local NSP's will
have control of the nodes (sub-networks). Likewise, the physical links are controlled and

owned by the individual NSP. Examples of the physical links connecting the nodes are
copper cable, satellites, and fiber optics.
It is assumed that there are adversaries of the DoD. The adversary's goal will be to
inflict damage on the network that voice messages are sent. Each foreign NSP is assumed to
be a neutral participant in the network. This disallows an adversary's NSP to be added to the
network accidentally due to its financial capabilities.
It is also assumed that one NSP can belong to more than one coalition. For example,
different coalitions can possibly based on geographic locations. Each coalition still needs to
be applied to the model to determine the best defensive/offensive and incentive allocation
strategy. Although the gaming theory is played numerous time and the percentage of time
that a NSP is attacked is calculated, it is still assumed that the adversary can only attack one
NSP at a time.
1.3.2 Objectives
The primary objective is to create a family of models that will help DoD determine a
defensive strategy for defense of their global voice communications. This research will
concentrate on the feasibility of integrating circuit-switching formulation into an interactive
linear and non-linear solving software package. This integration will be specific to the
networks that are or may be utilized by DoD to be used as a coalition prediction/incentive
tool. The following are the objectives supporting this thesis:
1. Identify the formulation and limitations of the current multi-criteria non-linear
methodology

2. Identify and gather all data and assumptions for integrating a circuit-switching
network into a multi-criteria non-linear formulation
3. Integrate the circuit-switching network into a multi-criteria non-linear formulation
4. Examine the usefulness of the circuit-switching network within multi-criteria nonlinear formulation
5. Try to determine the actual path that a message may be sent within the coalition.

1.4 Methodology
The first objective is to get a good understanding of multi-criteria practices. LINGO
can provide an interactive method to help solve the multi-criteria problem. It is an interactive
computer-software package that can be used to solve linear, integer, and non-linear
programming problems.
The second objective is to continue the literature review. The literature review is a
never-ending process to establish if any new relative information becomes available. It will
also prevent the reinvention of the wheel by finding what work has already been
accomplished in this area of concern. The bulk of the focus will be on network coalitions
and vulnerability.
The third objective is to gather all data and assumptions. These will be the basis that
will be needed to predict a network coalition's revenue. The fourth objective will be to take
this information and transform it into a format that can be inputted into the nonlinear
formulation. Using this formulation, the data will give accurate data output to analyze.

The fifth objective is performed when the non-linear formulation is complete.
Experimental runs will be conducted and output data collected. The following categories
below outline the steps needed to complete this project:

Evaluate Network Model:
A. Determine possible coalitions
B. Determine revenue from node i to node j within the coalitions

Apply Multi-Criteria Methods:
A. Formulate nonlinear problem using revenues
B. Solve multi-criteria nonlinear problem using computer software
C. Evaluate and interpret output data

Chapter 2. Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
In 1844, Samuel Morse invented the telegraph to transmit messages. Thirty-three
years later Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone. Not long afterwards, it was
realized that telephone to telephone connections had to converge at a common point, a
switchboard, to be connected. Initially theses switches were handled manually. It was not
until 1889 when Almond Stromger invented the two-motion systematic electro-magnetic
switch that the direct connection of two telephones was accomplished by the user's dial
pulses. This is commonly known today as circuit switching. Circuit switching is well tended
for delay-sensitive services such as voice communication. Some current day networks can
exceed 500 million telephone sets [Saadawi, 1994:399].
The more information that an organization can get about a given network, the better
they can evaluate the voice communication performance. An accurate prediction of the
telecommunication coalition that their verbal message travels will provide the decision maker
(DM) with a tool to use for security and incentive evaluation decisions. Such a vulnerability
prediction tool can give the DM a quantitative means to justify their communication usage
decisions.

By using multi-criteria non-linear methods combined with current

telecommunication revenues, a network vulnerability prediction tool can be created.
This chapter will discuss the structure of telecommunication networks.

2.2 Telecommunication Networks
Three main components make up a telecommunication network.

They are the

customer premise equipment (CPE), transmission facilities, and switching facilitates. The
CPE is the actual equipment located at the customers location. They may include telephone,
modem, and answering machines [Saadawi, 1994:22].
The transmission facilities can be further broken down to local loops and trunk lines.
Local loops are the connections between the CPE's and the local telecommunication
company's switching station. Local loops are also commonly refereed to as zones [Tayi,
1999:19] and clusters [Tsai, 1989:1059]. Local loops are made up of a group of nodes.
Nodes can be thought of as CPE's. Local loops can be connected by wire or fiber optics
cables.
Each local loop has one or more nodes that have links to other loop nodes called gates
or switching stations. These gates are connected by trunks. Where as the local loops are
dedicated for the individual customers, the trunk carries messages from many customers.
Trunks can range in length from one mile to thousands of miles. Trunks use a wider resource
of media to transmit its messages. These can include wire cables, radio, satellites, and fiber
optics.
2.2.1 Third Country Routing
Although most calls are routed from the originating country to the terminating
country, it is common for a telephone call to be routed through a third country. In a circuit
switched system, it can be more efficient to use a third country path. Country A can route a
call through Country B to terminate in Country C during busy hours between Country A and

C. This is usually the case between three NSPs, which are all in a different time zone, thus
each having a different peak time. This helps to prevent all the circuits from Country A to C
to be in use at any given time [van den Nouweland, 1996: 298].
Staple [1997] explains Home Country Beyond and callback services add to the
creation of third country calls. A home country beyond call may originate in Country A, be
billed to Country B via a calling card, and terminate in Country C. This allows Country B to
receive the call's revenue although the telephone call does not directly go through that
country. Callback service is similar. A caller in Country A calls a callback service in
Country B and hangs up after the first ring. Country B calls Country A and a call is placed to
Country C from Country B. Hence, the subscriber is in Country A, but the call originates in
Country B and terminates in Country C. In both cases, Country B gets the revenue while
Country A loses the revenue although the subscriber is in Country A. On the other hand, the
subscriber usually gets a lower rate for their call.

There are both moral and legal

ramifications of these methods.
The use of third country calling is usually limited to two link paths. There are two
major reasons for this two-path link limit. The first is to prevent a telephone call to route
back to the originating country. It is theoretically possible that a telephone call can get into a
loop depending on the routing algorithms used unless a rerouted call cannot be rerouted
again. The other reason is to prevent the congestion of the entire international telephone
network. Since only two path links are used, this limits the NSPs to three at the most, a NSP
in the originating country, a transit NSP, and an NSP in the terminating country.
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2.2.2 Vulnerability of Commercial Telecommunication Systems
Commercial telecommunications companies have been involved with vulnerability of
their networks since the civil war when military messages where sent via telegraph,
sometimes directly to the President himself.

During World War II, Bell Telephone

employees reestablished telecommunications in Germany and France so that military
commanders would have a reliable system to transmit messages. AT&T, during the cold
war, routed much of their telephone lines around major cities to prevent the physical damage
that may be caused by an adversary's nuclear strike.
Today, the physical damage is not as important as it was in the past. We must now
worry about the "intentional translation of a single digit in a million lines of computer code,
which, without instant remedy, can easily deny service to much of the national
telecommunication system" [Campen, 1995: 27]. This would not be that hard of a task if
there was only one NSP. Unfortunately, in an international telecommunication system, there
are many NSPs. Even a single country may have more than one NSP to handle its service.
Cohen in Protection and Security on the Information Highway wrote, "any system
designed purely for financial efficiency under normal operating conditions is highly
susceptible to intentional disruption." In order for the NSPs to consider vulnerability in their
networks, they must have some type of incentive in the way of revenue. Campen [1995: 27]
feels that it should come from the government. "The security differential should come from
the federal treasury if we are to have an information service that can operate in an inherently
unsafe environment."

11

2.3

Game Theoretic Approach
Game Theory is two players involved in a competitive game. The first player is

trying to maximize his or her own payoff while the second player is trying to minimize the
first players payoff.
In a two-person zero-sum game, the amount player one loses is also the identical
amount that player two wins. Theses winnings are based on the strategies that each player
chooses [Winston, 1994: 837]. Linear programming can be used to find the value and
optimal strategies for two-person zero-sum games. Linear programming and the simplex
method, developed by Dantzig in 1947, has been used to solve gaming theory problems
within both the military and industry.
Gaming theory has also been extended to «-person games. The payoff of each player
is based on the Shapley Value. The Shapley Value implies that player i 's reward should be
the expected amount that player / adds to the coalition made up of all the n players.
2.3.1 Cooperative Game Theoretic Approach
Cooperative game theory can be applied to telecommunication problems. Two areas
that cooperative game theory have been applied to are Terrestrial Flight Telephone System
(TFTS) and the rerouting of international telephone calls. TFTS is a system where multiple
agents have to cooperate to guarantee a profit. When a telephone call is made from an
airborne plane, it is received by a receiver on the ground. In Europe, this means that it may
be received in any one of a number of countries. Obviously, the company who routes the call
gets the profit. In addition, the more receivers on the ground, the more of a chance that that
area will receive the incoming call.
12

The rerouting of international calls is also a situation where multiple agents have to
cooperate to share the profits. During busy hours, calls can be rerouted through quieter
circuits. For example, at the prime time to call between America and Europe, a voice
message may be rerouted through Australia to guarantee that the America-Europe path is not
overloaded. This enables carriers to use their circuits more efficiently and to reduce the cost
of their networks. In order to generate profits through rerouting international calls, there are
three agents involved. They are the carriers in the originating country, the transit carrier, and
the carrier in the destination country.
When modeling the game theoretic approach, one is forced to recognize the
underlying structure. This approach not only concerns itself with individual players, but with
coalitions of players. This allows all players to see what their outcome will be dependent
upon the decision that is made. Their outcome is based on the coalition worth. The worth is
derived from the revenue that a player could make if he was part of a particular coalition.
Each players revenue then would be some sort of division of the coalition worth. One such
division would be proportional to the investment that a player made. This would insure
appropriate payback based on the amount of revenue gambled. This division is denoted as
Proportional Investment (PI). It is possible in telecommunication coalitions that a player
may actually lose revenue, thus would not want to be part ofthat particular coalition.
Common among many game theoretic problems, a division known as Shapley's
Value (SV) is commonly used. SV deals with the marginal contributions of players of a
particular coalition [van der Nouweland, 1996:301]. Players are assigned an average of their
contributions. In other words, the player receives the expected marginal contribution.
13

2.3.2 Non-cooperative Gaming Theory
Schavland [1998] defines non-cooperative gaming theory as a Blue network defender
versus a Red network attacker. A player has to be on one side or the other, thus a two-person
game. As the game is played, Blue's loss is Red's gain. In Schavland's example, if Red's
attack on Blue's network results in reliability dropping from 0.75 from 0.90, Blue's loss of
0.15 units is exactly Red's gain. Red is opposed to Blue's interest. Thus, the name of noncooperative game is applied.
Lyle et al. [1999] uses a non-cooperative gaming approach to determine the effects of
an adversary on a stochastic communication network-network. He examined the reliability
damage that an adversary inflicted upon his network. The non-cooperative gaming model
was ran to determine damage on the network with and without hardening strategies. He was
able to go one step further and determine the value of hardening.
Using Lyle as a basis, Schavland [1999] applied Lyle's non-cooperative game
theoretic approach to create an improvement strategy for a probabilistic network. Reliability
damage as well as flow damage was used to measure vulnerability. Using vulnerability, he
was able to create an improvement strategy to minimize Red's negative impact upon the
network. It was assumed that the game was being played multiple times.
Both Lyle and Schavland were able to determine the percentage of time that Blue
should harden a link and determine the percentage of time that Red would tamper with a
particular link. These percentages help determine the amount of improvement that a link
should receive if a budget was allocated to link improvement.
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2.4 Multicriteria Stochastic-Network Optimization
In telecommunication networks, reliability and throughput have been used as
measures of effectiveness. Chan [1996] and Schavland [1999] use multicriteria methods to
combine both reliability and throughput as a measure of effectiveness. This optimization has
been used to both improve a network and to design telecommunication networks that are less
vulnerable to tampering.
The optimization problem is reduced to a linear programming problem.

The

reliability of each arc is reduced to the reliability of each path with series-arc and parallel-arc
reductions. These provide three linear constraints to consider: reliability, throughput, and
budget-constraints. It is shown that varying the cost differences between the two criteria
affects the efficient frontier or tradeoff region [Chan, 1996:13]. A full-scale multicriteriaoptimization (MCO) model was used. This provided a means to explore the efficient frontier
as well as the varying effects of the cost-budget. It also provided the tradeoffs between
capacity versus reliability improvement.
With this method, there is no optimal solution.

Where there are numerous

alternatives to chose from, the identification of the ideal is not an easy task. Korhonen
[1988] suggests a visual interactive method for identifying efficient solutions without
actually needing to know the utility function. This is a heuristic iterating procedure, in which
a reference direction toward the ideal is chosen at each iteration. This direction maximally
minimizes the objective currently under consideration. The procedure terminates when the
objective under consideration reaches a local minimum over the non-dominated set.
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2.5 Summary
This chapter outlined the three parts of telecommunication networks, then discussed
each part in more detail.

This discussion was used to give a broad background into

telecommunication networks. This review illustrated that there may not be one optional
solution given multiple criteria.

Vulnerability prediction and coalition incentive

methodology will be explored more thoroughly in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3. Models and Methodology
3.1 Notation
BR
Bs
Btot
Cjj
c
tjj
t
Iy
I
I

Budget available for improving coalition's revenue
Budget availble for improving NSP A' s revenue
Total budget available for improvement and/or hardening
Cost of increasing retail charge of country i to country j by one unit
Vector of c,y's, including all countries in the coalition
Telephone traffic from country I to country j
Vector of %'s, including all countries in the coalition
Incentive denoting the revenue improvement from country i to country y
Vector oflj/s, including all countries in the coalition
Vector I excluding ]T (k + Iß)

yt

Game-theoretic decision-variable (continuous) denoting the percentage of
hardening effort at country i for the DoD (defensive) team decision maker
Vector of ^,'s, including all countries in the coalition
Game-theoretic decision-variable (continuous) denoting the percentage of
tampering effort at country / for the adversary (offensive) team decision
maker
Vector of -zy's, including all countries in the coalition
Number of countries in the coalition
Constant varying from the largest value such that Wj is at it's maximum
without the W2 constraint; all the way to H^'s maximum
Telephone Call revenue from country i to country y
Vector of r,/s for all communication links in coalition
Vector r excluding ^ (nj + rji)

j

y
Zj

z
n
s
r,y
r
r

j

To
r'
r'/
y.
R(r0)
i?(r')
Z?(r',)

Initial vector r (before incentive)
Vector r after incentive and before tampering
Vector r after an adversarial tampering has removed country /
Vector y where the decision was to harden
The current revenue worth of the coalition
The final revenue worth of the coalition
The final revenue worth of the coalition after a successful tampering has
removed country / from the coalition
S(r0) The current revenue for NSP A
S(r') The final revenue for NSP A
5(r';) The final revenue for NSP A after a successful tampering has removed country
i from the coalition
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Wj(r0, y,) The amount of damage caused to the coalition's worth by a given strategy
y, (on country /)
W)
The coalition worth (in dollars) derived using a game theoretic approach
W^ro, yd The amount of damage caused to NSP ,4's revenue by a given strategy y,
(on country /)
W2
NSP A's revenue (in dollars) derived using a game theoretic approach
3.2 NSP Coalitions
Voice network topology is made up as switching nodes and links. Switching nodes
are often referred to as International Switching Centers (ISC). With respect to this study, the
ISCs are controlled by the local NSP networks. Inter-ISC groups (coalitions) are where a
traffic relation exists due to a bilateral agreement among certain NSPs.

The bilateral

agreement is modified usually on a monthly or annual basis. This modification is usually due
to changes in routing plans, ISCs, or traffic flow. It was common for traffic relations to be
based on geographical location and bonds between countries and former colonies. Today's
world trade has added new considerations to traffic relations. Some examples would be
economic, political, and trade considerations.
3.3 Coalition Determination
Cooperative gaming theory will be used to determine what the best coalition of NSPs
that maximizes the parent country's revenue.

This method has been applied to

telecommunication problems such as billing long distance calls and rerouting international
telephone calls.

A coalition game consists of a player set N :- {1, 2,...,n} and a

characteristic function v that assigns to each coalition S £N of players a real v(S) that is to be
interpreted as the maximal revenues that that the members in the coalition can achieve when
they cooperate [van den Nouweland, 1996].
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3.3.1 NSPs'Investments
Here AT is defined as the set of countries (NSPs) in the derived network. It is assumed
that each NSP invests in the operation and maintenance of their respective transit/switching
exchanges and transmission links (satellite, radio, and cable). NTI's International Facilities
Analysis tables for each node provides the data needed broken up by the node's respective
NSPs. This data will be in tabular form illustrated in Table 3.1. The rows are the countries
and the column is their respective number of switching stations and telecommunication links.
NSP
A
B
C
D

#OF SWITCHING STATIONS
4
1
6
3

# OF EARTH STATIONS
6
1
8
4

Table 3-1 - Number of Stations
The number of stations of each NSP will be used later to help determine the division
of revenues for a given coalition.
3.3.2 NSPs' Revenues
The revenues of each NSP consist of two parts. The first part is the revenue created
by providing a telephone call from country i to country j. This will be calculated by using
TeleGeography's data on the telephone traffic from country /' to country j. All traffic is based
on millions of minutes. All dollars in this methodology are in millions of U.S. dollars. Once
the number of calls is realized, a cost per telephone call from country / that can be assigned
to the number of calls made to determine country i 's revenue. Since the scope of this project
is focused on the global, international network, it will be assumed that a telephone call from
country / to itself will provide revenue of $0.0. Local network traffic is not modeled in this
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study.

Since local calls are not usually switched through international NSPs, there is little

risk of a local call being rerouted through another country than the origin. There are some
exceptions such as with U.S. and Canadian NSPs. Some local calls may be routed from the
U.S. through Canada and then back into the U.S. Since all the data is derived international
calls from the origin to destination, the issue of local calls is a mute point.
The second source of revenue is based on agreements among each pair of countries
known as accounting or terminating rates. This agreement is used to maintain a balance of
telephone calls between country i and country /. If one country has fewer incoming calls
then the other country, the difference of the number of calls is taken into account. This
difference is divided equally and multiplied by a prearranged compensation cost.

This

creates a compensation value that is then paid by the country with a higher number of
incoming calls to the country with fewer incoming calls. Ideally, country i would route the
exact number of calls to country/ that country./ is routing to country /'. Unfortunately, since
a global telecommunication network can be very complex, this is not realistic. This revenue
will be either a positive or a negative value. For example, if country / has to compensate
country/ $100, country i and country/ 's revenues will be -$100 and $100 respectively.
This compensatory revenue can be calculated with the revenue of actually routing a
call from country / to country/ to create overall revenue. A revenue table can be created to
illustrate these overall revenues. The table represents the traffic flow revenue from country /
(row) to country/ (column). Each element ry is the revenue country / earns when a call is
routed to country/. An example is illustrated in Table 3.2.
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NSP
A
B
C
D

A
$0
$60.60
$44.00
$38.70

C
$77.60
$3.20
$0
$.70

B
$52.00
$0
$.30
$0

D
$48.20
$0
$.30
$0

Table 3-2 - Revenues from Country i to Country y Based on Telephone Traffic

3.3.3 Coalition's Revenue
With the data now available, the revenue that a coalition S of countries can jointly
realize within the cooperation of the countries can be calculated. It is assumed that the
countries of the network will cooperate among each other. This allows the revenue that the
members of coalition S can jointly realize with their coalition as the sum of revenues
generated by the countries ofthat coalition. Van den Nouweland [1996] simplifies it to

v(5,) = 2«» + ZZa&"
'

(1)

J

In simpler terms, the worth of the coalition of countries can be determined by summing up all
the revenues when the rows and columns not corresponding to the coalition countries are
crossed out.
In theory, all combinations of coalition groups can be generated. A sample of the
coalitions of interest and their joint revenues are as listed in Table 3.3. All values are in
millions of dollars.
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WORTH
$112.57
$121.56
$86.92
$237.61
$199.49
$209.47
$325.51

COALTION
AB
AC
AD
ABC
ABD
ACD
ABCD

Table 3-3 - Coalitions' Worth

3.3.4 Division of Revenues
The revenue of the coalition by them does not determine what coalition is most
advantageous to the parent country. Some type of division of revenues must be applied.
Two different methods will be used to determine the division of revenues. The first division
of revenue is based on the number of stations (percentage of investment) that each country
made to the coalition.

The percentages will be calculated using Table 3.1. Once the

percentages are determined, the overall revenues will be split proportionally to the
investments of the countries. This division will be denoted as Proportional Investment (PI).
The second method of division to be used is the Shapley Value (SV). With Shapley
Value, each countries receives their revenue based on their marginal contributions. The
general formula for division of revenue is
<(s-l)\*(n-s)
<(V(S)-V(s-i))
n\

&-Z-

n = total number of players
s = the number of players in coalition S
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(2)

For the case of telecommunications network coalitions, van den Nouweland [1996]
was able to reduce the Shapley Value to
aü+-*Yi(<*v + aß)

(3)

J*>

Once the revenues for the parent country are calculated for each method, the best
coalition for the origin node to be part of will be determined. Multi-criteria decision making
will determine what coalition is the most preferred from the U.S. NSP perspective. Table 3.4
illustrates monetarily a sample of the revenue for Country A to be a member of a particular
coalition using the three methods of revenue division listed above.
REVENUE FOR NSP A
AB
AC
AD
ABC
ABD
ACD
ABCD

PI
$93.43
$49.84
$50.41
$90.29
$103.74
$67.03
$97.65

MAX REVENUE FOR NSP A
$103.74
Table 3-4 - Revenue Division

SV
$56.29
$60.78
$43.46
$117.07
$99.75
$104.24
$160.53

$160.53

When a graph is made of all of the optimal solutions in the x-y plane with the .x-axis
score being the score on the PI objective and the ^-axis score being the score on the SV
objective, the graph is called the efficient frontier of tradeoff curve for the proposed division
of revenue. Using the data in Table 3.4, the efficient frontier can be created to find the most
preferred coalitions through the evaluation of the efficient points. All other points will be
eliminated since they are considered to be dominated.
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The most preferred coalition can now be chosen by using the standard l-norms (one,
two, and infinity). This is in essence measuring the distance from the efficient point to the
ideal point. The ideal point would be both the PI and SV values are at each of their
maximum amount. In this case, the point ($160.53, $103.74) is the ideal point. Each norm
represents a different approach by the DM to chose the most preferred coalition. The onenorm is known as the totally compensatory. It measures the distance from the ideal point
given that criterion affects the distance. The infinity norm is known as the totally noncompensatory. It measures the distance from the ideal point given that only the criterion
furthest from the ideal point affects the distance. Regret is the deviation between the ideal
point and the efficient point that is being evaluated. Each norm has a different type of regret.
The one-norm minimizes the sum of regrets, while the infinity-norm minimizes the
"maximize" regret from the ideal.
Ideally, one efficient point would be best for both the one-, two-, and infinity-norm.
If this were not the case, then the DM would have to decide whether they want to minimize
or maximize their regrets and chose the most preferred coalition accordingly.
3.4 Coalition Network
Once the most likely coalition is chosen, the international telecommunication network
can be illustrated with the data in Table 3.2. Each remaining country in the most preferred
coalition is in itself a node representing a particular nation's NSP. The links themselves are
the revenue that country / makes when they switch a telephone call to country j. There are
theoretically two links between set of countries. This is only possible if there exists no
circuits between country / and country j. For example, using Table 3.2 we can see that the
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link from Country A to Country B is $52.00 while the link from Country B to Country A is
$60.60. There is no source or sink. This is because we are not concerned with flow, but
instead of revenue of the entire coalition and each country NSP.
3.5 Models
3.5.1 Modell: Maximizefi
Since r' = r + I, let/; = R(r'). This single criteria problem maximizes the revenue of
the preferred coalition. The linear formulation is illustrated below.
Max/i =.R(r')
s.t.
r' < r +1
*

(4)

J

Ct = I

LINGO is an interactive computer-software package that can be used to solve linear
and non-linear programming problems. It is written by LINDO Systems. A free evaluation
copy can be downloaded at http://www.lindo.com. LINGO will be used to solve all of the
models represented here within this thesis. LINGO model formulation and optimized output
are available in the appendices.
It was assumed that differing amounts of incentive funds from DoD may be
available. Funds can are usually thought of as strictly dollars. In reality, incentive funds can
come in the form of international loans, wheat, or reduction in coat on military and economic
aid. The model was optimized at different levels of Btot. Obviously, when Btot = $0, the
coalition's maximum revenue was the same as it's initial revenue. The value of Btot was
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varied from $0 to $10,000.00.

Since the value of the coalition's revenue is just the

summation of all of the countries revenue, it is irrelevant at this point what country received
an incentive from any of the other countries. There are multiple optimal solutions because no
matter what part of the pot the incentive money goes into, it is all in the pot regardless.
3.5.2 Model 2: Maximize fL without Hardening
We let/; = W where r'i = r -1 The optimal solution to this model will give the
results from the maximization of coalition worth damage utility without hardening. The
linear formulation to Model 2 is given:
Max/i = Wi
s.t.
Wi < i?(r'0 (attack on NSP /)
r' < r +1

(5)

Ct = I

The coalition damage utility is based on gaming theory. This can be thought as of a
two-player game where the players are Blue and Red. Blue owns the network and has the
capability to improve the networks revenue worth with incentives. Red on the other hand
plans to tamper with the network and inflict the maximum amount of damage by removing a
country from the coalition. Blue must take into account Red's intentions when considering
what incentives to give to what countries. This leads to Model 2 distributing its incentive
over more countries.
This new thought process of Blue is a classic example of Game Theory. Red's goal is
to attack the country that results in the maximum damage to the coalition worth when a
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country is withdrawn from the coalition. The maximum damage is #(r') - R(r%) where i is
the country that Red convinced to withdraw from the coalition. This model was evaluated
for various values of Bt0, ranging from $0 to $10,000.
3.5.3 Model 3: Maximize//with Hardening
In Model 2, Blue did not have the option to harden. Hardening can provide a more
stable, robust network for DoD to send messages over. In Model 3, Blue has the option to
harden. It is assumed that the more diplomatic effort Blue spends on country /', the harder it
is for Red to convince country i to withdraw from the coalition.
Model 3's non-linear formulation is shown below.
Max/i = Wj

(6)

s.t.
Wj < [*(r',)][l-y]
r' < r +1
>

j

ct = I
i

It is also assumed that Red and Blue are repeatedly playing against each other; Blue
trying to maximize revenue while Red is trying to maximize damage. If the game were to be
played once, if Blue decides to harden country /, y,;= 1, all other y/s = 0. Likewise, if Red
attacks country /', zt = 1, all other z/s = 0. Gaming theory is formulated such that Blue must
chose 1 of m strategies. Simultaneously, Red must chose one of n strategies [Winston,
1994:824] Since it is assumed that this game will be played repeatedly, j/,'s and z,-'s will no
longer be 0-1 values. Instead they will be the percentage of times that Blue defends and Red
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attacks country /. The damage utility of each hardening/attack strategy intersection can be
shown in the Table 3.5. Each row denotes Blue's strategy to harden a particular country.
Each column is Red's strategy to attack a particular country.
A
R(r')
R(r'A)
R(r'A)
R(r'A)
R(r'A)

A
B
C
D
E

C
R(r'c)
R(r'c)
R(r')
R(r'c)
R(r'c)

B
R(r'B)
R(r')
R(r'B)
R(r'B)
R(r'B)

D
R(r'D)
R(r'D)
R(r'o)
R(r')
RO-'D)

E
R(r'E)
R(r'E)
R(r'E)
R(r'E)
R(r')

Table 3-5 -Game Theory Matrix
It is shown that in one round of the game, Blue hardens country i and red attacks
country /', there is no damage to the revenue of the coalition. On the other hand, if Blue
hardens country i and red attacks country j, there is some form of revenue damage. Each cell
in the table is the expected payoff dependent on what country Blue defends and what country
Red attacks. Over the life span of the game, the expected value to Blue is dependent on what
strategy z Red attempts. The overall expected value to Blue is the sum of expected payoffs
based on strategy y and strategy z. Obviously, Red will choose to tamper with the country
that will result in the minimum payoff to Blue. Again, this model will be using a range of $0
to $10,000 for Btot.
3.5.4 Model 4: Multi-Criteria with Hardening
The single-criteria models above were run to show how non-cooperative gaming and
improvement goals can be handled simultaneously. Now that this is established, a multicriteria optimization (MCO) model can be created. It is observed that the separate objective
functions are linked by revenue between country / and country y and DoD's incentive budget.
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The second objective function f2 is the revenue that the U.S. NSP would receive from the
coalition when the Shapley value is applied. This allows the DoD to show some level of
loyalty to the U.S. NSP by giving a determined amount of preference to them.

Max/j = Wj
Max/ = W2
s.t.
W2 < [S(r')][y] + [S(r',)][l-y]
Wj < [7?(r',)][l-y]
r' £ r +1

(7)

^(IAJ + I^^BS
j

Bs = Btot
ct = I

BR +

i

In a perfect world, both objective functions would be maximized. This usually is not
the case though. Hence the objective of Max/ = W2 is replaced with/ = W2>s.
Max/ = Wi
s.t.
f2=W2>s
W2<[S(r>)][y] + [S(r>d)[l-y]
Wj < [i?(r',)][l-y]
r' < r +1
'

j

(8)

j

Y,(h + IjA)<Bs
j

BR + BS

=

Btot

ct = I
Now the problem can be solved using a constraint reduced feasible region approach.
Model 4 will not find a single answer. Instead, it will find the maximum Wj over the range
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of s. Schavland [25:1999] shows that by parametrically varying the constant, s, from it's
largest value such that Wi is at its maximum without the W2 constraint - all the way to W2,s
maximum value, a frontier of non-inferior (efficient, non-dominated, Pareto-optimal)
solutions may be found.
To ensure linear independence between the two objective functions, the orthogonality
of the two objective vectors was investigated. It was concluded that the two objective
functions are indeed linearly independent.
3.5.5 Model 5: Entire NSPs'Shapley Value with Hardening
Model 5 is a adaptation of Model 4. Instead of the criteria being the entire coalition's
revenue and the US NSP's Shapley Value, there are n number of objectives. Each objective
is to maximize the revenue of each NSP in the coalition.
Max/! = Wi
s.t.
fk=W/c>S
^<[S(r')][y] + [5(r';)][l-y]
Wj < [S(r')][y] + [S(r»,)][l-y]
r' < r +1

(9)

^(Lv + WZBs
j

BR +

Bs = Btot

ct = I
*'=1,2,...
This formulation models a coalition who jointly try to maximize their individual
NSPs' Shapley Value within the coalition. There will be the same number, n, of objectives
to maximize as there are NSPs within the coalition network. Now there is a cooperative
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game played among the NSPs while a non-cooperative game is taking place between the
entire coalition and an adversary.
LINGO can not easily handle more than two objective functions. It uses a multiobjective revised simplex method. To solve Model 5, ADBASE will be applied. ADBASE
is a FORTRAN program for enumerating efficient extreme points and unbounded efficient
edges. It was written by Dr. Ralph Steuer at the University of Georgia. A free evaluation
copy was obtained for this thesis. ADBASE will be used to solve all of the Model 5
formulations represented here within this thesis. ADBASE model formulation and optimized
output are available in the appendices.
3.6 Summary
This chapter discussed the methodology developed to predict a coalition that an NSP
may choose to send a voice message and then to decide the vulnerability of that coalition's
network and where any incentive to a country could be useful to serve the needs of DoD. An
overview was provided to explain to the reader how the sections are inter-related. A section
was devoted to a circuit switching telecommunication network. Coalition Determination
section covered the methodology that will determine the best coalition within a global
telecommunications network and how it is formulated.
In Chapter 4, Example Analysis on Sample Network, a set of test NSPs will be
analyzed using gaming theory.
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Chapter 4. Example Analysis on Sample NSPs
4.1 Determination of Sample Coalition
Three sample NSPs (AT&T, MCI, and Sprint) were used to test the proposed
methodology. Each NSP was used separately to determine the most likely coalition that each
NSP would join based on revenue.
Six additional country's NSPs were used as possible coalition members.

The

countries are Australia (AU), France (FR), Germany (GE), Japan (JA), United Kingdom
(UK), and India (IN). Not only are the countries major NSPs in the international market,
adequate data is available to properly analyze the traffic in MiTT, retail cost per minute, and
accounting rates. Using these six countries and the appropriate U.S. NSP in the models,
there are 63 possible coalitions that the U.S. NSP may prefer to be a member. This was
calculated using the sum of the number of combinations of six objects taken r (r = 1...6)
times. The proposed methodology will be demonstrated with the U.S. NSP of AT&T.
4.1.1 NSP's Investment
NTI was used to determine the number of transit exchanges and earth stations that
each NSP owns. This, in addition to each coalition's worth, was used to determine the most
likely coalition that an U.S. NSP would join based on their proportional investment (PI). The
number of transit exchange and earth stations are illustrated in Table 4.1.
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Table 4-1 - Number of Stations of Sample Network

4.1.2 NSPs'Revenue
Using TeleGeography's 1996 data on MiTT, retail cost, and accounting rates, a
revenue table from country /' to country/ was developed for AT&T in Table 4.2.
NSP
ATT
AU
FR
GE
JA
UK
IN

ATT
-

$75.13
$33.44
$107.95
$226.20
$138.83
$125.44

AU
$107.85
-

$.09
$.11
$66.45
$108.67
$9.80

FR
$115.96
$.12
-

$165.51
$35.09
$130.33
$132.31

GE
$209.73
$28.08
$116.37
-

$43.26
$139.76
$23.10

JA
$238.67
$42.29
$7.19
$14.18
-

$35.07
$9.70

UK
$396.96
$155.16
$110.46
$164.22
$80.13
-

IN
$.78
$.18
$2.11
$.18
$2.56
$97.13

$44.63

-

Table 4-2 - Revenue from Country i to Country/ per Call of Sample Network
Table 4.2 helps to illustrate the political and geographical relationships between
countries and their international telephone networks. Looking at India's column, its revenue
is fairly low except with the United Kingdom. This may be because India was at one time a
colony of the United Kingdom. Similarly, Australia has a higher revenue with the United
Kingdom. Geographically, Australia also has higher revenue with Japan possibly due to their
proximity to each other in Asia.
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4.1.3 Coalition Worth
Table 4.2 was then used to determine the coalition's worth. Table 4.3 gives the
value to a sample of the possible 61 coalitions that AT&T may consider to be a member.
WORTH
$182.98
$149.39
$410.04
$603.34
$960.32
$948.48
$1,372.99
$1,609.70
$2,255.18
$1,962.99
$2,098.46
$1,939.80
$2,857.68
$2,740.36
$3,541.15

COALTION
ATT-AU
ATT-FR
ATT-FR-IN
ATT-JA-IN
ATT-AU-FR-GE
ATT-AU-FR-JA
ATT-AU-FR-UK
ATT-FR-GE-JA-1N
ATT-FR-GE-UK-IN
ATT-FR-JA-UK-1N
ATT-GE-JA-UK-IN
ATT-A U-FR-GE-JA-IN
ATT-AU-GE-JA-UK-IN
ATT-A U-FR-GE-UK-1N
ATT-A U-FR-GE-JA-UK-IN

Table 4-3 - Coalitions' Worth of Sample Network
It is obvious that unless there is a negative revenue from country i to country j, the
coalition with the maximize revenue would be the largest coalition.
4.1.4 Division's of Revenue
The revenue that AT&T can achieve from each coalition can now be computed.
Table 4.1 and 4.3 will be used to determine the Proportional Investment (PI) that AT&T will
receive, where as Table 4.2 will determine AT&T's revenue per coalition using the Shapely
Value (SV) formula. AT&T's revenue per coalition is listed in Table 4.4. Once again, only a
sample of the coalitions are shown.
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REVENUE FOR ATT
ATT-AU
ATT-FR
ATT-FR-IN
ATT-JA-IN
ATT-AU-FR-GE
ATT-AU-FR-JA
ATT-AU-FR-UK
ATT-FR-GE-JA-1N
ATT-FR-GE-UK-IN
ATT-FR-JA-UK-1N
ATT-GE-JA-UK-IN
ATT-A U-FR-GE-JA-1N
ATT-A U-GE-JA-UK-IN
ATT-A U-FR-GE-UK-1N
ATT-A U-FR-GE-JA-UK-IN

PI
$101.66
$72.87
$167.36
$236.61
$234.22
$237.12
$356.62
$279.95
$479.83
$426.74
$437.18
$343.33
$510.30
$498.25
$532.50

SV
$91.49
$74.70
$137.81
$295.55
$325.02
$398.62
$434.08
$529.08
$564.54
$638.14
$722.18
$620.57
$813.77
$656.03
$888.47

Table 4-4 - Revenue Division of Sample Network
In this case, no multi-criteria methods need to be applied. The best coalition for
AT&T to become a member of based on revenue is ATT-AU-FR-GE-JA-UK-IN. This is
because the maximum revenue for AT&T based on both PI and SV is from the largest
coalition. This does not imply that we should always pick the largest coalition. Nor does it
imply that that the same coalition is the most preferred for the Proportional and Shapley
Value division of revenues.

This output is unique to this U.S. NSP and the other

international NSPs that were chosen to evaluate this model. Other runs on different U.S.
NSPs reinforces that any of these possible coalitions are possible candidates.
The ideal point would be at the point that both the PI and SV revenue were
maximized. In this case, it would be the point ($532.50, $888.47). All the other points are
dominated by this ideal point; thus, the l-norm does not need to be investigated. This is a
unique situation. It is not always guaranteed that the largest coalition will always be the most
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preferred. Nor would the PI and SV methods always choose the same coalition as the most
financially preferred.
4.2 ATT-AU-FR-GE-JA-UK-IN Sample Network
Now that the most preferred coalition is chosen, it can be represented graphically.
This is illustrated in Figure 4-1. Using the data in Table 4.2, the coalition can be expressed
as a network. Each arc is the revenue made for country / by sending traffic to country/ The
arcs are multi-directional to account for the revenue made from country/ to country /.
Each arc represents the revenue made from traffic that originated from country / and
terminates in country j. The data supplied by TeleGeography is based solely on where the
traffic originated from and it's final destination. Since it does not take into account that the
call made have been routed through another country's NSP, this network is not a strictly
physical network.
4.3 Application of Single-Criteria Models to Sample Network
Models 1-3 above were applied to the sample network derived for AT&T. LINGO
was used for all calculations. LINGO was well adapted for these purposes since it solves
both linear and non-linear mathematical problems. The appendices show that the LINGO
input files are linear for Models 1-2, but becomes non-linear for Models 3-4. This is due to
the ability to harden in Models 3-4.
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Initial ATT-AU-FR-GE-JA-UK-IN Network

($165.51, $116.37)

ATT
FR
GE
JA
UK
IN
AU
(x,y)
<
►

AT&T
France
Germany
Japan
United Kingdom
India
Australia
(revenue from country;" to country j, revenue from country j to country i)
OD link between country i and country j

Figure 4-1 - Graphic Representation of Telecommunication Network
All input files for Models 1-4 are included in the appendix. All formats are in
LINGO and should be self-explanatory in nature.
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Each model allocated its incentive resources differently. Maximizing the coalition
revenue (Model 1) is not the same as maximizing the coalition's revenue after a worst case
node tampering (Model 2). In Model 1, all resources ($10) were allocated to one arc, India to
Australia. In reality, the incentive could have been allocated anywhere within the coalition
since the only concern is to maximize the coalition. In Model 2, where a NSP may be
convinced to withdraw from the coalition, the incentive of $10 is best spent on the arc AT&T
to India. This enforces that neither AT&T or India is a NSP that the adversary would have
high interest to convince to withdraw from the coalition.
The artificial break point is when the budget to spend on incentive is over $1000 for
Model 2. This spreads the incentive out over multiple arcs. This is in anticipation of a NSP
being removed from the coalition. This makes it harder for the adversary to determine where
to tamper. Both Model 1 and 2 give a global optimal answer.
Model 3 allows the capability to harden as well as giving incentives to selected NSPs.
Hardening could be the physical act of improving a network, or it could be diplomatic efforts
to convince a NSP to be faithful to the coalition and be a strong member. All of the $10
incentive should be spent on the arc India to Australia because the adversary has no desire to
try and remove these NSPs from the network. Thus, there is no financial risk of losing the
incentive added to the coalition's revenue. This is shown in Table 4.5 with the z, column
why the India to Australia arc was chosen.
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ATT
AU
FR
GE
JA
UK
IN

Vi

Zi

.13
.27
.06
.54

.29
.24
.31
.16

Table 4-5 - Decision Variables at Bm = $100
It is assumed that the U.S. NSP, AT&T in this example, is loyal to the DoD's cause,
so there will be no hardening or tampering with that node. The adversaries attack strategy, zh
is derived from the dual of the model. They indicate the most likely places where the
adversary will tamper. It can be shown that the dual of the DoD's maximization of revenue
model is the adversary's minimization of the revenue model. Both the DoD and adversary's
models have an optimal solution Wi.

Thus, using the Dual Theorem, the DoD's

maximization of revenue equals the adversary's minimization of revenue. Complementary
slackness is used to simultaneously solve the DoD and adversary's model. There is a stable
equilibrium because nether the DoD and the adversary can improve their situation by a
unilateral change in strategy. The z, column shows that the adversary has no interest in
tampering with India or Australia, so it is logical that the IN-AUarc would be the best place
to expend the incentive since there is little financial risk involved with losing that arc.
Similarly, yt is the DoD's hardening strategy. It is derived from the game-theoretic
decision-variable denoting the percentage of hardening effort at country i. A majority of the
hardening, 54%, would be expended on the United Kingdom to maximize the coalitions
revenue. The logic of this can be derived from the coalition network, besides AT&T, there
are no other NSPs whose arcs contribute as much revenue as the United Kingdoms. Thus, it
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is natural that the most effort should be spent on the United Kingdom to stay in the coalition.
Likewise, 27% of the effort should be spent on Germany due to their next highest revenue
contribution to the coalition.
The amount of incentive determines the amount of hardening for each NSP. Figure
4.2 shows how the recommended hardening percentage changes for the United Kingdom as
the budget is increased.

United Kingdom Hardening

-United
Kingdom
Hardening

5000

10000

15000

Budget

Figure 4-2 - Relationship between UK Hardening and Budget
Although the incentive money is given to over six arcs, the percentage of hardening
for the United Kingdom NSP continuously goes up. This is of interest if the DoD wanted to
maximize its hardening effort. Any amount of incentive over $10 to the coalition ensures
that a majority of the hardening will be placed on one NSP, the United Kingdom. Since
these models are discrete in nature and specific to each individual network, there are no error
probabilities.
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4.4 Application of Multi-Criteria Model to Sample Network
Model 4 is an adaptation of Model 3. Besides the addition of a second objective
function, an additional constraint is added to model. The constraint is BR + Bs = B,ot. This
will allow the DoD to determine the division of funds to the coalition versus AT&T to ensure
that the coalition revenue is maximized subject to AT&T receiving their share of revenue.
Model 4 was investigated with the Bm = $100. To determine the range of s, the
model was changed to maximize /} only. This provided the lower bound on s. Then the
model was changed to maximize/ without regards to/}. This determined the upper bound
on s. Any value larger than the upper bound resulted in an unfeasible solution for Model 4.
Then analysis was conducted to find the value of/; over the range of s. Figure 4.3 shows the
relationship between the coalition revenue worth and AT&T's Shapley revenue worth.
The DM has several choices at this point.

They may chose to maximize the

coalition's revenue. If that is the case, the coalition would make $2898. AT&T would earn
$722 of that revenue. On the other hand, DoD may want to maximize AT&T's revenue to
exhibit patriotism. This would maximize AT&T's revenue with $798 out of the $2751 that
the coalition would earn. The value of the coalition's revenue went down since the optimum
strategy of where to spend the incentive could not be applied. This was to ensure that
AT&T's revenue was maximized first, then the coalition worth was maximized. Each case
has it's own specific hardening strategy to ensure that these values are met.
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Efficient Frontier: Coalition Vs ATT
Revenue Worth
Ideal Point

it
S3

$820
$800
$780
$760
$740
$720
$700
$2,700 $2,800 $2,900 $3,000
Coalition Revenue Worth

Figure 4-3 - Tradeoff Between ATT and Coalition Revenue Worth
Compromise programming can be applied to the efficient frontier if no satisfactory
solution exists [Chan, 1999:5-13].. In this case, the ideal point (max fi|f2 > 0, max fi|f2 > 0)
is not achievable. The distance from the ideal point is a function of the metric parameter, the
deviation metric. The Manhattan and Euclidean deviation metrics can be accommodated
with the lp-norm. The norm assumes the function:

/j'j'^V-^/lj'rJ'.fl"

(10)

w' = range of weights
p = metric parameter,/? e ({1,2,... }u{oo})
It is assumed that w',- = 1 for all Fs unless otherwise specified. The Lj or Manhattan
metric is a totally compensatory tradeoff altitude by the DM.

The DM treats the

contributions of each criterion equally. The L2 or Euclidean is based on its geometric
properties.

The Z,«, or Tchebycheff metric corresponds to a totally non-compensatory
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tradeoff. The DM wants to minimize their maximum deviation from the ideal. It can simply
be expressed as max(w\d\).

The results of the l-norms on the sample network are

i

summarized in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4-4 - Sample Network l-Norm Distances
The most preferred points for each l-norm are listed in Table 4.6.

l-norm
Lj

L2
L/oo

fi -Coalition Revenue
$2898
$2864
$2853

(2-AT&T Revenue
$723
$745
$752

Table 4-6 - Preferred Efficient Points for Each l-Norm
The most obvious preferred efficient point to select graphically is for Li. Since this /norm chooses the best efficient point based on the criteria's contributions, it is natural that
this point would maximize the coalition revenue worth. This is because the entire coalition
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contributes more to the model than just AT&T alone. Both L2 and Lac picked an efficient
point between the maximum of the coalition and AT&T's revenue worth. Table 4.7
summarizes the hardening strategy that the DM should accept given that they chose a totally
non-compensatory tradeoff.
ATT
AU
FR
GE
JA
UK
IN

Vi

Zi

.07
.22
.20
.51

.42
.35
.23

Table 4-7 - Decision Variables at Btat = $100 and Lm
Figure 4-5 shows the results from Model 4 with the budget set at $100 and using the
Li norm. Between the two objective functions, it is shown that all of the incentive is spent on
the AT&T - Australia arc. Since the adversary has no interest in tampering with these arcs,
it is the natural choice to guarantee that the incentive spent will not be tampered with. The
United Kingdom gets a majority of the hardening since it becomes the natural target of
exploitation. Australia and India get no hardening.
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Figure 4-5 - Results from Model 4 (Lj)
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Figure 4-6 - Results from Model 4 (Li) without Incentive
An incentive is not needed to ran Model 4. The results will still provide a hardening
as well as a tampering strategy that will be helpful in the defense of the coalition. Figure 4-6
represents these results. The similarities can be seen with Model 4 with and without an
incentive.
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Model 5 was to be ran using ADBASE. Unfortunately, ADBASE is not "user
friendly." It is difficult and very easy to set up the data files. In addition, the documentation
was not clear or unavailable.

It was not possible to run the seven objective game in

ADBASE.
It was possible though to run all possible pairs of NSPs in LINGO to maximizes their
Shapley Value worth's. After the models were ran and the data analyzed, the distance of
efficient frontier to the ideal solution were calculated.
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Figure 4-7 - Germany-U.K Distance from Ideal
In most case as in Figure 4-7, The L2 and Lx had the same Shapley Value worth.
Unfortunately, the Lj was at a different value for each case. This observation only applies
towards each set two NSPs. This observation was based on what set of NSPs were chosen to
analyze. When the NSPs had a significant difference in the revenue that they provided, the
Lj was never the same as the L2 and Z,«> On the other hand, when the revenue was of each
NSP had a smaller difference, the L] was closer to the L2 and L«, if not the same value. Since
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the Li is based on the contribution of the criterion, the closer the two NSPs are in value, the
closer they will be to the L2 and Lm No conclusions could be made about sets of NSPs
greater than three that want to all maximize their Shapley Value worth.
Even though a steady equilibrium of 1-norms could not be reached, Model 5 does
provide a hardening strategy, as well as a tampering strategy that can be used to form a
stronger coalition where all NSPs cooperated among each other. This is of use not only to
DoD, but also to the coalition regardless or not DoD has an incentive budget.
4.5 Value of Model without Revenue Improvement
It is not necessary for DoD to provide an incentive described in this modeling
approach. It may also be that the DoD does not have or want to spend a large amount of
money a coalition network. If this is the case, the DoD can still use the model to help
determine the best hardening strategy without running the incentive portion of the model.
Schavland represents this as a "descriptive" application of the models formulation. The
results will not only give an optimal hardening strategy be given, but a optimal tampering
strategy as well. The optimal tampering strategy is the shadow prices or dual variables at
optimality.
Model 4 can be reduced to linear in nature compared to when it was non-linear with
the budget. If the budget is set to $0.0, then model four is as follows:
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Maxf^Wj
s.t.

(11)

f2 = W2>s
W2<[S(r')][y] + [S(r%)][\-y]
^<[i?(r',)][l-y]
r' < r +1
i

J

J

Y,(lAj + IjA)<BS
j

BR + Bs=$0.0
ct = I

2>=i
i

With Btot being equal to $0.0 and BR and Bs having to be positive because they are
budgets, this implies that BR and Bs are also equal to $0.0. This reduces the model another
step.
Max/i = Wi
s.t.
f2=W2>s
^[S(r')][y] + [S(r',)][i-y]
Wj<[R(r%)][l-y]
r' < r +1
'

j

(12)

j

£(/4/ + ^)<S0.0
j

ct = I

I>=i
i
Using the same logic with the incentive having to be positive but less than or equal to
$0.0, then it is implied that the incentive I, is also $0.0.
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Max/i = Wi
s.t

(13)

f2=W2>s
m<[S(r')][y] + [S(r%)l[l-y]
Wj<[R(r%)][l-y]
r' < r + $0.0
ct = $0.0
i

If the traffic, t, is positive and ct equals $0.0, than c must equal 0. Likewise, since r*
is the vector r with incentive, then r' must now equal r since there is no incentive. The r
vector is just the revenue values from Table 4.2 instead of revenue as a function of I.
Max/i = W]
s.t.
f2=W2>s
W2<[S(r)][y] + [S(ri)][l-y]
^<[i?(r,)][l-y]

(14)

i

This model can be derived yet another way. Table 4-8 list the revenue of the entire
coalition depending on what strategies DoD and the adversary uses. The diagonal cells au
are the coalition's revenue if DoD hardens NSP i and the adversary attacks NSP /'. The cells
aiyj are the revenue of the coalition if DoD hardens NSP i and the adversary attacks NSP/.
Sample coalition revenues are given for the likely hood that either France, Japan, or the
United Kingdom is attacked.
NSP
ATT
AU
FR
GE
JA
UK
IN

ATT
$3,541.15

AU
$3,541.15

FR
$2,857.68
$2,857.68
$3,541.15
$2,857.68
$2,857.68
$2,857.68
$2,857.68

GE

$3,541.15

JA
$2,740.36
$2,740.36
$2,740.36
$2,740.36
$3,541.15
$2,740.36
$2,740.36

Table 4-8 - Coalition Revenue
50

UK
$1,939.80
$1,939.80
$1,939.80
$1,939.80
$1,939.80
$3,541.15
$1,939.80

IN

$3,541.15

Using linear programming to model optimal revenue for the coalition given there is
an adversary attacking, the following formulation is derived:
(15)

Max/i = Wi
s.t.
Wi < ][>,,}>,

2>=i
The same procedure can be applied for each NSP's Shapley Value. The diagonals
would be the optimal revenue for each NSP based on the Shapley Value and no adversary.
The other cells would be the revenue after an adversary successfully attacks a NSP. These
models still allows for the objective values and hardening strategy. Both models without
revenue improvement was analyzed to determine the best hardening and tampering strategy.
Both models gave the same optimal solutions based on the same data in all cases. Table 4.9
lists the results. Besides giving a hardening strategy, these models also gave a globally
optimal solution.
ATT
AU
FR
GE
JA
UK
IN

Vi

Zi

.08
.23
.17
.51

.42
.35
.23

Table 4-9 - Decision Variables at L2
Subsidy is not a necessity of the models in effecting a secure coalition.

It is

assumed that the defensive measure actually comes from the diplomatic efforts of DoD to
keep all NSPs in the coalition. Unless the DoD specifies where the incentive money is to be
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spent, the incentive is just a catalyst to help determine where and how much the DoD should
spend its diplomatic effort.
Figure 4.2 illustrates this methodology. If the DoD has a historical advantage to use
its diplomatic effort with an U.K. NSP, they can determine how much incentive they want to
spend on the coalition. Any amount over $5000 will guarantee a majority of the hardening
with the U.K. NSP. In addition, wether they spend $5000 or $10000 on incentive, there is
not a significant amount of change in the diplomatic effort that should be applied. This puts
bounds on the amount of money that the DoD should optimally spend.
4.6 Optimality
Both Model 1 and 2 provided an global optimal solution based on LINGO's
optimality determination function. This was not the case with Model 3 and 4. LINGO
indicates when a solution is either a global or a local optimal solution. LINGO indicated that
both Model 3 and 4 do not yield globally optimal solutions, but instead locally optimal. This
indicates that the solution given by LINGO may not be the global optimal. A local optimum
can possibly be the global optimal, but this would have to be investigated in all cases where
the solution was deemed local optimal.
The Hessian of the objective functions was calculated to check for concavity and
convexity. When the £th leading principle minors were analyzed, it was concluded that the
objective functions are indeed neither concave nor convex.
Since the objective function is not convex, other optimal points had to be explored.
This is common in LINGO when a model is non-linear. LINGO lets the modeler give initial
values, guesses, in their INIT section to try to find other optimal points. When this was
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applied, no other optimal points were found, suggesting that the optimum solution is indeed a
global optimum.
When Models 4-5 had their incentives set to $0.0, the models could be reduced to a
linear format. When these formats were ran in LINGO, they provided a global optimum with
the exact solutions as the non-linear models when the budget was set to $0.0. This further
reinforces that the answers given with the non-linear problems are more than likely global
optimums.
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Chapter 5. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Summary
This thesis proposed a new, game-theoretic, revenue criterion, for coalition's revenue
improvement and security.

This methodology was demonstrated in a multi-criteria

optimization model. The model was applied to a network derived from collected 1996
telecommunications data.
5.2 Conclusions
• The option to harden NSPs has measurable value whether or not an incentive is
provided for the coalition.
•

The adversary's tampering strategy is revealed in the shadow prices associated
with the game constraints.

• The two objective functions, fi and f2, are different measures of effectiveness. A
network optimized for one objective is more than likely not optimized for the
other objective.
• Minimal DM participation is needed to obtain these results.
•

There is no one "best" answer. There is only the most preferred answer that best
meets the DM's needs.

•

The L2 and Lx had the same Shapley Value worth for Model 5.
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5.3 Future Work
• This thesis assumed that there are adversaries outside of the coalition. This
methodology can be inspected to see if a n-person zero sum game approach can
be applied to Model 3 and 4. The players would be the NSPs. This may be of use
to a NSP as a way to determine the best approach to compete financially with
other NSPs within the international telecommunication community.
• Build upon this methodology to build a path prediction model. The data used in
this thesis was the traffic switched from origin to the final destination.
Investigation of whether data that shows the traffic from country /' to country j
regardless whether or not it is rerouted can be of great use. It may be combined
with the coalition determination, cooperative gaming theory of this thesis to try to
predict the NSPs that a voice communication may travel. A possibility could to
be look at the trade balance of one country to another and try to predict what links
may need more traffic to even out the trade of calls. The model could be ran at
different time intervals. These outputs could be statistically investigated to try to
determine the physical path that a voice message may travel.
• Apply a multi-objective revised simplex method such as ADBASE to Model 5
and analyze the output.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1 - LINGO Input Files for Sample Network

! MODEL 1 INPUT;
IMAXF1;
! ATT-AU-FR-GE-JA-UK-IN;
!Btot=100;
MAX = F1;
W=F1;
! COALITION MAX WORTH;
W=rTF+rFT+rTG+rGT+rTJ+rJT+rTU+rUT+rTI+rIT+rFG+rGF+rFJ+rJF+rFU+rUF+
TFI+rIF+rGJ+rJG+rGU+rUG+rGI+rIG+rJU+rUJ+rn+rU+rUI+rIU+rAT+rTA+
TAF+rFA+rAG+rGA+rAJ+rJA+rAU+rUA+rAI+rlA;
! REVENUE CONSTARINTS;
rTF<=115.96+ITF;
rFT<=33.44+IFT;
rTG<=209.73+ITG;
rGT<=107.95+IGT;
rTJ<=238.67+ITJ;
rJT<=226.20+IJT;
rTU<=396.96+ITU;
rUT<=138.83+njT;
rTK=.78+ITI;
rIT<=125.44+IIT;
rFG<=116.37+IFG;
rGF<=165.51+IGF;
rFJ<=7.19+IFJ;
rJF<=35.09+IJF;
rFU<=110.46+IFU;
rUF<=130.33+IUF;
rFK=2.11+IFI;
rIF<=132.31+IIF;
rGJ<=14.18+IGJ;
rJG<=43.26+IJG;
rGU<=164.22+IGU;
rUG<=139.76+IUG;
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rGK=.18+IGI;
rIG<=23.10+IIG;
rJU<=80.13+IJU;
rUJ<=35.07+IUJ;
rJK=2.56+IJI;
rIJ<=9.70+IIJ;
rUI<=97.13+IUI;
rIU<=44.63+IIU;
rAT<=75.13+IAT;
rTA<=107.85+ITA;
rAF<=.12+IAF;
rFA<=.09+IFA;
rAG<=28.08+IAG;
rGA<=.ll+IGA;
rAJ<=42.29+IAJ;
rJA<=66.45+IJA;
rAU<=155.16+IAU;
rUA<=108.67+IUA;
rAK=.18+IAI;
rIA<=9.80+IIA:

! INCENTIVE REVENUE;
ITF=87.86*cTF;
IFT=82.72*cFT;
ITG=168.81*cTG;
IGT=157.62*cGT;
ITJ-154.6*cTJ;
UT=186.1*cJT;
rrU=370.58*cTU;
IUT=332.89*cUT;
ITI=109.12*cTI;
IIT=22.69*cIT;
IFG=325.9*cFG;
IGF=389.8*cGF;
IFJ=l*cFJ;
IJF=21*cJF;
IFU=317.7*cFU;
IUF=360.8*cUF;
IFI=.l*cFI;
IIF=5.8*cIF;
IGJ=.l*cGJ;
IJG=25.9*cJG;
IGU=365.1*cGU;
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IUG=364.4*cUG;
IGI=.l*cGI;
IIG=13.2*cIG;
IJU=48*cJU;
IUJ=.l*cUJ;
UI=l*cJI;
IIJ=6.9*cIJ;
IUI=55.5*cUI;
IIU=25.5*cIU;
IAT=85.67*cAT;
ITA=68.04*cTA;
IAF=.l*cAF;
IFA=.l*cFA;
IAG=24*cAG;
IGA=.l*cGA;
IAJ=34*cAJ;
IJA=33.4*cJA;
IAU=182*cAU;
IUA-127.3*cUA;
IAI=.l*cAI;
IIA=5.6*cIA:
! BUDGET CONSTRAINTS;
87.86*cTF+82.72*cFT+168.81*cTG+157.62*cGT+154.6*cTJ+186.1*cJT+
370.58*cTU+332.89*cUT+109.12*cTl+22.69*cIT+325.9*cFG+389.8*cGF+
. 1 *cFJ+21 *cJF+317.7*cFU+360.8*cUF+. 1 *cFI+5.8*cIF+
. 1 *cGJ+25.9*cJG+365.1 *cGU+364.4*cUG+. 1 *cGI+13.2*cIG+
48*cJU+.l*cUJ+.l*cn+6.9*cIJ+55.5*cUI+25.5*cIU+
85.67*cAT+68.04*cTA+. 1 *cAF+. 1 *cFA+24*cAG+. 1 *cGA+
34*cAJ+33.4*cJA+182*cAU+127.3*cUA+. 1 *cAI+5.6*cIA=Btot;
Btot=100;
END
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! MODEL 2 INPUT;
! MAX Fl WITOUT HARDENING;
! ATT-AU-FR-GE-JA-UK-IN;
!Btot=100;
MAX = F1;
! COALITION WORTH DAMAGE UTILITY;
FK=W-rFT-rTF-rFG-rGF-rFJ-rJF-rFU-rUF-rFI-rIF-rFA-rAF;
FK=W-rGT-rTG-rGF-rFG-rGJ-rJG-rGU-rUG-rGI-rIG-rGA-rAG;
FK=W-rJT-rTJ-rJF-rFJ-rJG-rGJ-rJU-rUJ-rJI-rU-rJA-rAJ;
F1 <=W-rUT-rTU-rUF-rFU-rUG-rGU-rUJ-rJU-rUI-rIU-rUA-rAU;
FK=W-rIT-rTI-rIF-rFI-rIG-rGI-rIJ-rJI-rIU-rUI-rIA-rAI;
FK=W-rAT-rTA-rAF-rFA-rAG-rGA-rAJ-rJA-rAU-rUA-rAI-rIA;
! COALITION MAX WORTH;
W=rTF+rFT+rTG+rGT+rTJ+rJT+rTU+rUT+rTI+rIT+rFG+rGF+rFJ+rJF+rFU+rUF+
TFI+rIF+rGJ+rJG+rGU+rUG+rGI+rIG+rJU+rUJ+rJI+rU+rUI+rnj+rAT+rTA+
rAF+rFA+rAG+rGA+rAJ+rJA+rAU+rUA+rAI+rIA;

! REVENUE CONSTARINTS;
rTF<=115.96+ITF;
rFT<=33.44+IFT;
rTG<=209.73+ITG;
rGT<=107.95+IGT;
rTJ<=238.67+ITJ;
rJT<=226.20+IJT;
rTU<=396.96+rrU;
rUT<=138.83+IUT;
rTK=.78+ITI;
rIT<=125.44+IIT;
rFG<=116.37+IFG;
rGF<=165.51+IGF;
rFJ<=7.19+IFJ;
rJF<=35.09+IJF;
rFU<=110.46+IFU;
rUF<=130.33+IUF;
rFK=2.11+IFI;
rIF<=132.31+IIF;
rGJ<=14.18+IGJ;
rJG<=43.26+IJG;
rGU<=164.22+IGU;
rUG<=139.76+IUG;
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iGI<=.18+IGI;
rIG<=23.10+IIG;
rJU<=80.13+IJU;
rUJ<=35.07+IUJ;
rJI<=2.56+IJI;
rIJ<=9.70+IIJ;
rUI<=97.13+IUI;
rIU<=44.63+IIU;
rAT<=75.13+IAT;
rTA<=107.85+ITA;
rAF<=.12+IAF;
rFA<=.09+IFA;
rAG<=28.08+IAG;
rGA<=.ll+IGA;
rAJ<=42.29+IAJ;
rJA<=66.45+IJA;
rAU<=155.16+IAU;
rUA<=108.67+IUA;
rAI<=.18+IAI;
rIA<=9.80+IIA;

! INCENTIVE REVENUE;
ITF=87.86*cTF;
IFT=82.72*cFT;
ITG=168.81*cTG;
IGT=157.62*cGT;
ITJ=154.6*cTJ;
UT=186.1*cJT;
ITU=370.58*cTU;
IUT=332.89*cUT;
ITI=109.12*cTI;
IIT=22.69*cIT;
IFG=325.9*cFG;
IGF=389.8*cGF;
IFJ=.l*cFJ;
IJF=21*cJF;
IFU=317.7*cFU;
IUF=360.8*cUF;
IFI=.l*cFI;
IIF=5.8*cIF;
IGJ=.l*cGJ;
IJG=25.9*cJG;
IGU=365.1*cGU;
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IUG=364.4*cUG;
IGI=.l*cGI;
IIG=13.2*cIG;
IJU=48*cJU;
IUJ=.l*cUJ;
IJI=.l*cJI;
IIJ=6.9*cIJ;
IUI=55.5*cUI;
IIU=25.5*cIU;
IAT=85.67*cAT;
ITA=68.04*cTA;
IAF=.l*cAF;
IFA=.l*cFA;
IAG=24*cAG;
IGA=.l*cGA;
IAJ=34*cAJ;
IJA=33.4*cJA;
IAU=182*cAU;
IUA=127.3*cUA;
IAI=.l*cAI;
IIA=5.6*cIA;

! BUDGET CONSTRAINTS;
87.86*cTF+82.72*cFT+168.81*cTG+157.62*cGT+154.6*cTJ+186.1*cJT+
370.58*cTU+332.89*cUT+109.12*cTI+22.69*cIT+325.9*cFG+389.8*cGF+
. 1 *cFJ+21 *cJF+317.7*cFU+360.8*cUF+. 1 *cFI+5.8*cIF+
. 1*CGJ+25.9*CJG+365. 1 *cGU+364.4*cUG+. 1 *cGI+13.2*cIG+
48*cJU+.l*cUJ+.l*cJI+6.9*cIJ+55.5*cUI+25.5*cIU+
85.67*cAT+68.04*cTA+. 1 *cAF+. 1 *cFA+24*cAG+. 1 *cGA+
34*cAJ+33.4*cJA+182*cAU+127.3*cUA+. 1 *cAI+5.6*cIA=Btot;
Btot=100;
END
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! MODEL 3 INPUT;
! MAX Fl WITH HARDENING;
! ATT-AU-FR-GE-JA-UK-IN;
!Btot=100;
MAX = F1:

! COALITION WORTH DAMAGE UTILITY;
FK=W-(rFT+rTF+rFG+rGF+rFJ+rJF+rFU+rUF+rFI+rIF+rFA+rAF)*(l-yF);
F K=W-(rGT+rTG+rGF+rFG+rGJ+rJG+rGU+rUG+rGI+rIG+rGA+rAG)*( 1 -yG);
FK-W-(rJT+rTJ+rJF+rFJ+rJG+rGJ+rJU+rUJ+rJI+rIJ+rJA+rAJ)*(l-yJ);
Fl<=W-(rUT+rTU+rUF+rFU+rUG+rGU+rUJ+rJU+rUI+rIU+rUA+rAU)*(l-yU);
FK=W-(rIT+rTI+rIF+rFI+rIG+rGI+rIJ+rJI+rIU+rUI+rIA+rAI)*(l-yI);
F K=W-(rAT+rTA+rAF+rF A+rAG+rGA+rAJ+rJA+rAU+rUA+rAI+rIA)*( 1-yA);
! COALITION MAX WORTH;
W^TF+rFT+rTG+rGT+rTJ+rJT+rTU+rUT+rTI+rIT+rFG+rGF+rFJ+rJF+rFU+rUF+
rFI+rIF+rGJ+rJG+rGU+rUG+rGI+rIG+rJU+rUJ+rJI+rIJ+rUI+rnj+rAT+rTA+
rAF+rFA+rAG+rGA+rAJ+rJA+rAU+rUA+rAI+rIA;
! REVENUE CONSTARINTS;
rTF<=115.96+ITF;
rFT<=33.44+IFT;
rTG<=209.73+ITG;
rGT<=107.95+IGT;
rTJ<=238.67+ITJ;
rJT<=226.20+IJT;
rTU<=396.96+ITU;
rUT<=138.83+nJT;
rTK=.78+ITI;
rIT<=125.44+IIT;
rFG<=116.37+IFG;
rGF<=165.51+IGF;
rFJ<=7.19+IFJ;
rJF<=35.09+IJF;
rFU<=110.46+IFU;
rUF<=130.33+IUF;
rFI<=2.11+M;
rIF<=132.31+IIF;
rGJ<=14.18+IGJ;
rJG<=43.26+IJG;
rGU<=164.22+IGU;
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rUG<=139.76+IUG;
rGK=.18+IGI;
rIG<=23.10+IIG;
rJU<=80.13+IJU;
rUJ<=35.07+IUJ;
rJI<=2.56+IJI;
rIJ<=9.70+IIJ;
rUI<=97.13+IUI;
rIU<=44.63+IIU;
rAT<=75.13+IAT;
rTA<=107.85+ITA;
rAF<=.12+IAF;
rFA<=.09+IFA;
rAG<=28.08+IAG;
rGA<=.ll+IGA;
rAJ<=42.29+IAJ;
rJA<=66.45+IJA;
rAU<=155.16+IAU;
rUA<=108.67+IUA;
rAI<=.18+IAI;
rIA<=9.80+IIA;

! INCENTIVE REVENUE;
ITF=87.86*cTF;
IFT=82.72*cFT;
ITG=168.81*cTG;
IGT=157.62*cGT;
ITJ=154.6*cTJ;
IJT=186.1*cJT;
ITU=370.58*cTU;
IUT=332.89*cUT;
ITI=109.12*cTI;
IIT=22.69*cIT;
IFG=325.9*cFG;
IGF=389.8*cGF;
IFJ=.l*cFJ;
IJF=21*cJF;
IFU=317.7*cFU;
IUF=360.8*cUF;
M=.l*cFI;
IIF=5.8*cIF;
IGJ=.l*cGJ;
UG=25.9*cJG;
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IGU=365.1*cGU;
IUG=364.4*cUG;
IGI-.l*cGI;
IIG=13.2*cIG;
IJU=48*cJU;
IUJ=.l*cUJ;
m=.l*cJI;
IIJ=6.9*cIJ;
IUI=55.5*cUI;
IIU=25.5*cIU;
IAT=85.67*cAT;
ITA=68.04*cTA;
IAF=.l*cAF;
IFA-l*cFA;
IAG=24*cAG;
IGA=.l*cGA;
IAJ=34*cAJ;
IJA=33.4*cJA;
IAU=182*cAU;
IUA=127.3*cUA;
IAI=.l*cAI;
IIA=5.6*cIA;
! BUDGET CONSTRAINTS;
87.86*cTF+82.72*cFT+168.81*cTG+157.62*cGT+154.6*cTJ+186.1*cJT+
370.58*cTU+332.89*cUT+109.12*cTI+22.69*cIT+325.9*cFG+389.8*cGF+
. l*cFJ+21 *cJF+317.7*cFU+360.8*cUF+. 1 *cFI+5.8*cIF+
. l*cGJ+25.9*cJG+365.1 *cGU+364.4*cUG+. 1 *cGI+13.2*cIG+
48*cJU+. l*cUJ+. 1*CJI+6.9*CIJ+55.5*CUI+25.5*CIU+
85.67*cAT+68.04*cTA+. 1 *cAF+. 1 *cFA+24*cAG+. 1 *cGA+
34*cAJ+33.4*cJA+182*cAU+ 127.3*cUA+. 1 *cAI+5.6*cLA=Btot;
Btot=100;
! GAME BUDGET;
yF+yG+yJ+yU+yI+yA=l;
END
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! MODEL 4 INPUT;
! MULTI-CRITERIA WITH HARDENING;
! ATT-AU-FR-GE-JA-UK-IN;
IBtot^lOO;
!S-752,1-INF;
MAX = F1;
F2>=S;
S=752;
! ATT'S SHAPLEY WORTH DAMAGE UTILITY WITH GAME VARIABLES;
F2<=(Ro*yF)+(RF*(l -yF));
F2<=(Ro*yG)+(RG*(l-yG));
F2<=(Ro*yJ)+(RJ*(l-yJ));
F2<=(Ro*yU)+(RU*(l-yU));
F2<=(Ro*yI)+(RI*(l-yI));
F2<=(Ro*yA)+(RA*(l-yA));
! ATT'S SHAPLEY WORTH WITH ALL NODES (Ro) AND WITH ONE EACH
REMOVED FROM COALITION (Ri);
Ro=(rTF+rFT+rTG+rGT+rTJ+rJT+rTU+rUT+rTI+rIT+rTA+rAT)*.5;
RF=Ro-((rTF+rFT)*.5);
RG=Ro-((rTG+rGT)*.5);
RJ=Ro-((rTJ+rJT)*5);
RU=Ro-((rTU+rUT)*.5);
RI=Ro-((rTI+rIT)*.5);
RA=Ro-((rTA+rAT)*.5);
! COALITION WORTH DAMAGE UTILITY;
FK=W-(rFT+rTF+rFG+rGF+rFJ+rJF+rFU+rUF+rFI+rIF+rFA+rAF)*(l-yF);
FK=W-(rGT+rTG+rGF+rFG+rGJ+rJG+rGU+rUG+rGI+rIG+rGA+rAG)*(l-yG);
FK=W-(rJT+rTJ+rJF+rFJ+rJG+rGJ+rJU+rUJ+rJI+rU+rJA+rAJ)*(l-yJ);
FK=W-(rUT+rTU+rUF+rFU+rUG+rGU+rUJ+rJU+rUI+rnj+rUA+rAU)*(l-yU);
F1 <=W-(rIT+rTI+rIF+rFI+rIG+rGI+rIJ+rJI+rIU+rUI+rIA+rAI)*( 1 -yl);
F K=W-(rAT+rTA+rAF+rFA+rAG+rGA+rAJ+rJA+rAU+rUA+rAI+rIA)*( 1 -yA);

! COALITION MAX WORTH;
W=rTF+rFT+rTG+rGT+rTJ+rJT+rTU+rUT+rTI+rIT+rFG+rGF+rFJ+rJF+rFU+rUF+
TFI+rIF+rGJ+rJG+rGU+rUG+rGI+rIG+rJU+rUJ+rn+rIJ+rUI+rnJ+rAT+rTA+
rAF+rFA+rAG+rGA+rAJ+rJA+rAU+rUA+rAI+rIA;
! REVENUE CONSTARINTS;
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rTF<=115.96+ITF;
rFT<=33.44+IFT;
rTG<=209.73+ITG;
rGT<=107.95+IGT;
rTJ<=238.67+ITJ;
rJT<=226.20+IJT;
rTU<=396.96+ITU;
rUT<=138.83+IUT;
rH<=.78+m;
rIT<=125.44+IIT;
rFG<=116.37+IFG;
rGF<=165.51+IGF;
rFJ<=7.19+IFJ;
rJF<=35.09+IJF;
rFU<=110.46+IFU;
rUF<=130.33+IUF;
rFK=2.11+IFI;
rIF<=132.31+IIF;
rGJ<=14.18+IGJ;
rJG<=43.26+IJG;
rGU<=164.22+IGU;
rUG<=139.76+IUG;
rGK=.18+IGI;
rIG<=23.10+IIG;
rJU<=80.13+IJU;
rUJ<=35.07+IUJ;
rJI<=2.56+IJI;
rIJ<=9.70+IIJ;
rUI<=97.13+IUI;
rIU<=44.63+IIU;
rAT<=75.13+(85.67*cAT);
rTA<=107.85+(68.04*cTA);
rAF<=.12+(.l*cAF);
rFA<=.09+(.l*cFA);
rAG<=28.08+(24*cAG);
rGA<=.ll+(.l*cGA);
rAJ<=42.29+(34*cAJ);
rJA<=66.45+(33.4*cJA);
rAU<=155.16+(182*cAU);
rUA<=108.67+(l27.3*cUA);
rAI<=.18+(.l*cAI);
rIA<=9.80+(5.6*cIA);
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! INCENTIVE REVENUE;
ITF=87.86*cTF;
IFT=82.72*cFT;
ITG=168.81*cTG;
IGT=157.62*cGT;
ITJ=154.6*cTJ;
nT-186.1*cJT;
ITU=370.58*cTU;
IUT=332.89*cUT;
ITI=109.12*cTI;
HT=22.69*cIT;
IFG=325.9*cFG;
IGF=389.8*cGF;
IFJ=.l*cFJ;
IJF=21*cJF;
IFU=317.7*cFU;
IUF=360.8*cUF;
M=.l*cFI;
IIF=5.8*cIF;
IGJ=.l*cGJ;
IJG=25.9*cJG;
IGU=365.1*cGU;
IUG=364.4*cUG;
IGI=.l*cGI;
IIG=13.2*cIG;
IJU=48*cJU;
IUJ=.l*cUJ;
IJI=.l*cJI;
IIJ=6.9*cIJ;
IUI=55.5*cUI;
IIU=25.5*cIU;

! BUDGET CONSTRAINTS;
82.72*cFT+157.62*cGT+186.1*cJT+332.89*cUT+22.69*cIT+325.9*cFG+
389.8*cGF+.l*cFJ+21*cJF+317.7*cFU+360.8*cUF+.l*cFI+
5.8*cIF+. 1 *cGJ+25.9*cJG+365.1 *cGU+364.4*cUG+. 1 *cGI+
13.2*cIG+48*cJU+. l*cUJ+. l*cJI+6.9*cIJ+55.5*cUI+
25.5*cIU+85.67*cAT+. 1 *cAF+. 1 *cFA+24*cAG+. 1 *cGA+
34*cAJ+33.4*cJA+182*cAU+127.3*cUA+.l*cAI+5.6*cIA=BR;

87.86*cTF+168.81*cTG+154.6*cTJ+370.58*cTU+109.12*cTI+68.04*cTA=BS;
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BR+BS<=Btot;
Btot=100;
! GAME BUDGET;
yF+yG+yJ+yU+yI+yA=l;
END
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